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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF VTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
- vs .JESSEE BAUTISTA and
.JOH~ FRANCIS BAVTISTA,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
13007

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

ST.\TE~IENT

OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

Thr appellants, Jessee and John Francis Bautista,
appeal from the convictions of rape and robbery entered
against thrm in the Second Judicial District Court,
\\'<'bcr County. State of Vtah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Thr appellants were charged by information with
thr crimes of rape and robbery. Upon pleas of not guilty
a jury trial was held and appellants were each found
guilt\· of rape and robbery and committed to the Utah
State Prison for ten years to life.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the convictions should be
affirmed.

2
ST.-\TE:\lEl\'T OF FACTS
Respondent b.1sically agrees with the app<'llant's
chronological summation of the e\·iclencc aclcluccd at
appellants' jury trial. Hm\T\Tr, certain charactrrizatiom
of the nature of the e\·idcnce contained in appclants'
brief arc rC'pucliatccl by JTsponclcnt and. berathe thr,c
characterization.-; constitute part of appellants' lcQ"al argument, respondent \\·ill rebut them in the fnllm,·ing
arguments.
Appellants imply that the prosccutrix \\·as not forced
off the road and abducted bv the cldendants. but that
they merely pull eel up along side her, ,,·histkd and \\·ai\ cd
at her, and that she then willingly pull<'d O\'cr and
stopped for them. Appellants imply that the prnsccutrix
was confused in her O\\n mind as to ,,·hcthcr she stoppnl
willingly or ,,·as forced off the road, and stated that
"under cross-examination, she stated the other auto
merely pulled up along side her and did not pull in front
of her." They also imply that the prosccutrix ,,·as confused as to \\·hether the defendants had a pistol or not.
These aq:!:uments are spuriou.s and \\holly unfounded, a'
the facts of record clearlv indicate.
On direct examination, the pro..,ecutrix stated that
the defendants pulled out to pass her. As they came along
side her, she had to \'Cer m·cr to the right side and stop.
Two mC'n then jumped out from the car, ran m-cr to her
car, and immediately jumped into hn car, one in the
front passenger side and one in the dri\Tr\ Sl'at. She
testified that thcv had a _gun and told her to get in the
micldlc (R. 11<1,· 120). She further stated that _-,he did
not stop \·oluntarilv, and that it happened so List thl'n·
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,ras nothing she could do to avoid it. When questioned
,\·ith respect to the gun, she stated that the person on
the passenger side had a gun in his hand, although she
could not describe it ( R. 122).
On cro-.s-cxamination. the prosecutrix related the
same fach as stated above. Contrary to the implication
in appcll::tnts' brief that on cross-examination "she stated
the other auto merely pulled along· side her and did not
pull in front of her.'' the record establishes (R. 145-152)
that sh<' \\·as run off the road and forceably abducted .
..\pp<'llants indicate that at no time did the prosecutri.\ attempt to sound an alarm or make an escape.
Tlw record ckarh· reflects. howe,·er, that she was placed
in the n'ar srat of a two-door car. with two defendants
in th<' front. and onr in thr back with her at all times.
Sh<' sLttcd that ''I didn't make anv attempt to get away
l)(c;1 u-..<' I t bought they were real dangerous, the way
thn made me belic\T. I beliC\-cd they were going to
'hoot it nut." (R. 174). It is difficult to ascertain just
11 hat kind of heroic antics appclants would expect from
:1 \<Hiil\.!: girl placed in these circumstances .
.\pp'.'lbnts imply in their brief that the prosecutrix
rnnpna tcd in rcmm·ing at least some of her clothing.
Tlw record rdkcts. ho\\T\Tr, that she struggled and
fou!_!ht with them and begged them not to do anything
tn hn. :\t one time, cluring the struggle to disrobe her
,Jic begged. "No. my chastity means more than my life
tn nw." upon which the assaulting defendant stated,
"Ob\·, gin· me the gun," ancl he reached into the front
q·;1t (R. 1:rn). She further stated, "A man in the front
v\1t grabbed my hand and told me to cooperate with
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them, they were dangerous and if I did just what they
told me to they wouldn't hurt me and I had better do it.
There was nothing else I could do." ( R. 131 ) .
On cross-examination she again stated she struggled
and fought to pre\'ent her clothes being remo\·ed. After
being hit in the head or chest and threatened with a
gun she realized that resistance was futile (R. 165-168).
Appellant stresses the fact that when the Ogden
police stopped the vehicle, they saw a boy and girl in
the back "and they appeared to be embraced most of
the time." The prosecutrix stated that when the police
arrived, the defendant in the back with her remo\'ed
the hat from her eyes so it wouldn't look suspicious. He
then put his arms around her and told her not to try
anything ( R. 136). She stated that she knew they had a
gun and though they were realy takin,g her back to her
car, so did not attempt a warning to the police ( R. 13 7).
The fact that the police officers thought the couple in
the back were boyfriend-girlfriend was as planned by
defendant.
One officer at the scene testified that he saw the man
in the back put his arm around the girl as he pulled up,
and that the girl
"had a white object on her head. It looked as if
it were a night ski cap or something of that srni.
It was pulled down more on the side of her face
and clown o\'er her face a little bit, whether she
did it or he did it. I don't know, but it did seem
to slide clown mTr her face, someone pulled it.
He did, as I mentioned, put his arm around her
at that time.'' ( R. 218).

5
Defense counsel called Robert Gallegos (R. 248), alleged Iv employed at a service station where defendants
made a stop while the prosecutrix was being held in the
car. His was the only testimony actually indicating that
the girl was cooperating with the defendants and not
apparently being held by force. He stated that the girl
said "put three dollars in," and paid for the gas. He also
stated that there was no indication of any problems and
that they appeared to be going steady and having a good
time ( R. 2-10). Later it was determined that Gallegos
could not possibly have witnessed the above occurrence,
as he testified under oath. The respondent established
bv jail records and direct testimony that on the evening
in question Gallegos was incarcerated in the Weber
County Jail (R. 275, 279).
ARGU~IENT

POINT I
TIIF TRIAL COCRT DID NOT ERR IN DISPLAYING
:\ CO-I >El'f'.\D:\:\'T '.\OT O:'\ TRIAL, TO THE JURY FOR
ll>F'\TIFIC..\TIO:\' PCRPOSES WHILE CHAINED, HANDCl TFFI >. l.'.\SH:\ \"E:\'. U:'\GROOMED, AND DRESSED IN
C0\!\10:\ J.\IL ATTIRE.

Respondent contends that the appearance of the codcfcndant. Batchrlor, at the trial for identification purposes. and his appearance in prison attire was not so
indicatiH~ of his prisoner status as to prejudice the defrnclants' trial. The trial judge's ruling to that effect
~hould be sustained.
This incident took place during the direct examination of Gilbert Gallegos, witness for the defense. Over
object ions of defense, the judge brought Batchelor into
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court for identification purposes. Gallegos was asked if
Batchelor had been with the defendants and prosecutrix "·hen they pulled into his service station on the
night in question: Gallegos stated that he was absolutely
positi\'e that Batchelor was not in the car, and that he
had ne\·er seen him in his life. Batchelor was then immediately remo\'ed from the court.
Defense counsel objected to Batchclor's appC'arance
in jail attire. The court statC'd:
"Let the record show that Batchdor has been
brought clm\n, and that he is in jail clothes ancl
the defcnsc makes a motion to redress him hcforr
they put him in thc court room. Thc court denies
this. I hclin·c the jury understands that he is in
jaiL and he has jail clothes on. and he has been
brought in in irons and is handcuffed."
The court then proceeded to bring in the co-defendant. but indicated that he could not be in chains and
leg irons ( R. 2:J-l ) .
In proceedings in chambers defense again objected
to the introduction of Batchelor in jail attire and requested a mistrial. Such objection was based upon the
fact that:

":\Jr. Batchelor ,,·as brow~ht in in jail clothes
with hi.;; shirt-tail out and unsha\'Cll \\ith his hair
uncombed and apparently no attempt to alert him
to the fact that he was going to be introduced at
trial."
The judl(e then questioned the jailer as to Batchclor's
appearance. The jailer stated that this was the way he
dresses all the time and that he never shaves. He statrd
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that Batchclor's hair was combed when he was brought
into court and that he was dressed in the regular jail
apparel ( R. 282).
The prosecutor stated that the sole purpose of callinl! Batchelor was strictly for identification purposes.
He ga\·e no testimony. He just sat in the courtroom and
\\·as silent and no testimony was elicited from him, nor
\HTC there any plans to elicit testimony from him (R.
284).
Ddcnse indicated that his objection was not directed
to \\ hcther or not the identification was proper or impropf'r, but that his objection was to the condition in
\\·hich he was brought into the court (R. 285). The
judge then stated that he felt the defendant did not look
that hacl. that he looked like an ordinary prisoner, and
on·rrtdccl the objection, in order to avoid delay of the
trial.
Tlw derision of the trial court not to permit a contim1:111rc or further delay but to allow the co-defendant
to appear before the jury in jail attire is a matter for
th<' sound discretion of the trial judge. In State v. Hartman,]()] l'tah 298. 104. 119 P.2d 112 (1941), the Utah
Supreme Court held that:

"The granting of a continuance in a criminal
ca.se is discrctionarv with the court, and its refusal to grant a continuance is not reversible error
unless clearly prejudicial."
Other cases so holding are State v. Fairclough, 86
l tah '.r~h ..14 P.2d 692 ( 1935), and State v. Williams,
,19 l'tah 1'.!0. 161P.1104 (1917). It is also a matter of
the discretion of the court if the delay requested does
1
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not rise to the "dignity'' of a continuance. 88 C.JS.
Trial. Section 45.

Gregory v. Cnitcd States, 365 F.2cl 203, 205 (8th
Cir. 1966), outlines the standard of re\·iew for a case
involving judicial discrrtion and the presumption of innocence. In Grrgorr, the cldendant was seen by two
members of the jury in handcuffs. The l'nited States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rnkd that it
was not prejudicial error and said:
"To justify a nc\\· trial this alle.ged error must
appear to ha\'C scriously affected the fairness of
the trial. The burden of proof to sustain thi." allegation is on the appellant. The handling of the
defrndant during the trial is best rcgulatecl by
the trial court and is a mattcr for its sound discretion. For this court to question the di.-;rretion
of the trial court, the rccord needs to shm, something more than the mere fact ddcndant \\'as
handcuffed in the presence of the jury.'' (citations
omitted)
In Ros(' v. State, 4'.iO P.2cl 527 ( 1969), the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that it is not sufficient
merely to claim prejudice because the dcfrnclant "as
tried in jail clothes. The court held the record must sho\\'
how the defendant \\·as prejudiced by shm,·ing the kind
of clothing he was \\Taring. Appellant had not sho\\TI
that his appearance as clcscribcd in the record has prejudiced his case or destroyed for him the presumption of
mnoccnce.
In Statr v. Arlzufrtta, :"'J()l P.2d 263 ( 1972), the lTtah
Supreme Court very recently aclclressecl itself to this
issue. Herc, the dcfcnclant was found guilty of robbery.
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Thr onh issue raised as a basis for reversal was that the
court rrrccl in overruling defense objection to proceeding with thr trial while he was dressed in what he characterizes as "jail clothing." In sustaining the lower court
the Sta tr Supreme Court held:
"Thr concern of the court is not whether there
may be some irregularity, or a failure to meet the
desire or convenience of the defendant or his
counsel. It is whether the defendant is placed at
some disackantage or difficulty resulting in prejudice \\·hich deprived him of a fair trial in the
srnsc that there is some reasonable likelihood that
in its absence there may have been a different
result. Ina.-;much as it is the responsibility of the
trial judge to sec that the trial is fairly conducted
and hr is in the brst position to observe such circumstances. the determination of the question
ju-.;t stated must necessarily rest within his sound
cli.;;cretion; and because this reviewing court is in
a lc-.;s ach-antaged position, we will not reverse
hi.-.; judgment thereon unless it is clearly shown
that he has abused his discretion.
There is nothing shO\\TI in the instant case to
pcr-.;uacle us that the trial judge did so abuse his
di-.;crction. The defendants' attire is not of an
unusual nature for voung men, and it is not necessarih· associated \~ith ]ails. Even if it were, it
clrn< not strike us that there would be anything
strange, shocking, or prejudicial if the jury became a\\·an' that a man who had been arrested
and charged with robbery was in custody and
being held in jail." (Emphasis added)
The appellant states that the jury, seeing Batchelor
in jail clothes. would have instilled in their minds the
idea that his defendants were "a worthless lot," thus
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prejudicing their chances for a fair trial. Howr\'er,
Batchelor \\·as a third party witness. not on trial "·ith
the defendants. \\Then brought into court, it \\·as established that he had not been \\·ith the defendants on the
night in question. then he \\·as tTmm·cd from the jury's
presence. The appellant is far from com·incing in stating
that such an appearance by a third party prejudiced the
defendants' chances for a fair trial in the sense that thrre
was a reasonable' likelihood that in its absence there mav
ha\T been a diff crent result.
In a minorit\· of jurisdictions. some com·ictions ha\-r
been re\Trsed for clefcnclants' appearance in pri-;on
clothing. \\·hen the pri-;oner -;tatus of the clefcnclant has
been indicated by \\·ords or numbers printed on the
clothes. In all such cases. the issue im·oh-ccl the defendants' thcm-;ch-cs being in such attire. There arc no jurisdictions holding that the presence of a witness in j;1il
attire. not a clcfenclant in the trial itself. \\·oulcl han· a
prejudicial effect on the defendants f)('ing tried. The
cases cited by the appellant in his argument arc all distinguishable in that they relate to the dcfrncbnts thcmsehTs appearing before the court in jail attire. and arc
not extended to third parties not on trial.
The Supreme Court in Archu/tfta, indicated that the
defendants' claim of prejudice \\·as further minimized
by the fact that the court instructed th<' jury that the

mnc fact the defendant had been charged with an offense "as not only c\'ickncc of guilt and was not e,·cn a
circumstance to be considered in determining guilt or
innocense (:->01 P.'.:!cl '.:!6-1).
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In the instant case, the following instructions were
gi\'cn to the jury by the trial court:
Instruction No. 4:
"The fact that the defendants have been
charg-ccl with a crime and have been held to
answer thereto is not to be regarded as any evi<~cnce of their guilt and no inference or presumpt 1011 acl\'erse to them should be drawn because of
those facts.''
For the reasons stated abo\'e, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in allowing the co-defendant, Batchelor, to enter the court in jail attire and the decision of
tlw trial court to O\'errule appellants' request for a mistrial \hould be affirmed.
POl:\'T II
Tl IE TRI:\L C:Ol"RT DID :\'OT ERR IN FAILING TO
.\ \I ISTRl.\L BASED O:\' THE PROSECUTOR'S
.\LLFCEI > lffRISl\"E ST.\TE\lE:\'TS CO~CERNING DEn \I> \'\'IS R:\CL\L A:\'D SOCIAL BACKGROUND .
< .R.\YI'

.\ppdlants in their brief have resorted to material
omis-.,io11\ and distortion of fact clearly presented in the
comt record regarding the prosecutor's closing statemrnts. Such disto11ions and omissions in appellants' brief
"nc prepared in an attempt to manufacture prosecutori;tl misconduct "·here none existed .
.\ppcllants ciuote the following from the record as
the prosecutor\ statement:
"\Vhv would she go out with a person not of
her own. racc, a per;on she never knows, and a
person that allegedly flags her down on Washing-

12
ton Boulevard? . . . and anybody that would do
that is about as low an indivi.dual that ;·ou will
ever come across."
Appellants then argue that such comments disparage
the appellants and appeal to racial and social bias.
Examination of the record, ho\\'C\'Cr, reflects the following conversation by the prosecutor (R. 323-325):
"Next, you have to ask yoursekes, if .Jill Bateman is going to engage in sex. illicit scx. \\·hv is
she going to choose these t\\·o indi\·iduals ri.ght
here? \Vhat is there about these t\\·o peoplc o\·cr
here that is so appealing? .Jill Bateman, a daughter of a dentist. a daughter of a school teacher. a
student at \\' eber State College. a cicntal technician, by her O\\'TI testimony is a religious girL a
virgin, why would she go out \\·ith this caliber of
individual? She belongs to a social soorrity. From
such you can dra\\' thc implication that she \\·ants
to meet similar situated peoplc as her. peoplr
with her 0\\11 background. people she can empathize with. people that she feels familiar with,
perhaps meet somebody that somc clay can support her in thc manner in which she is accustomed. \Vhy \\'oulcl shc go out \\·ith a person
not of her m,·n race, a person shc never knO\\·s.
and a person that allegedly flags hcr cJm,11 on
\Vashington Boulevard?
"Do you think that .Jill Batcman is that kind
of a girl? Arc you going to bclin'C Jill Bateman,
or arc you going to bclicvc these individuals here,
an individual alrcaclv has onc felony count against
him not just anv f~lonv count, but a.'isault with
a d~adly weapon' - not unrelated to the alleged
charge here, deadly weapon, in this case. \Vho
arc you going to believe? \Vhat docs .Jill Bateman
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have in common with these fellows? She has absolut~ly nothii:tg. These people would be reprehe?s1?le to. Jill Bateman_. !here was smoking,
dnnkm~ gomg on, and this is not the kind of activity that she would engage in, illicit sex is not
the kind of activity she would engage in.
"\Vhat did Mr. Jess Bautista here testify to?
\Veil, he separated from his wife. What did Jill
sav. that one of the fellows said he hadn't had sex
fo~ six months. \Vhat were they doing? They were
dragging up and down the boulevard looking for
girls. They found a girl. They had to run her
off the road to find her though. They had to put
a gun to her and three of them had to take her
out west here somewhere and then three of them
tak<'s turns with this girl. That is how they had
their sex that night. And anybody that would do
that is about as low an individual that you will
ever romc across. Anybody that would make a
girl submit to something like that is about as low
a person as you will find."

It is clear from the full record, taken in context, that
t lie prosecutor's remarks were directed to the type of
condurt that the prosecutrix would not be associated
"ith - such activities as smoking, drinking, illicit sexual activities that would be reprehensible to the prosecutrix regardless of the race or social background of
those participating.

It is also obvious that the prosecutor, when he made
the statement that:
"Anybody that would do that is about as low
an individual that you will ever run across. Anyone that will make a girl submit to something
like that is about as low~ person as you will find."
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He was not referring to the racial and social background of the appellants, as they imply. He was obviously referring to anyone that would forceably abduct a
young girl and rape her at gunpoint.
The appellant relics solely on a 1915 Louisiana
case, State v. JVashington, 136 La. 855, 67 So. 930
(1915), as a basis for its argument. Such comments as
were made by the prosecutor in this Louisiana case should
be reversible error. Hm\"C\·er, the case is distinguishable
on its facts. Clearly, no such disparaging and biased remarks were made by the prosecutor in the instant case,
as the record above reveals.
Great latitude should be g1\Tn to both counsel for
state and dcfendant and a \\·ide freedom of expression
is authorized in presenting their closing arguments. (;ates
v. State, 90 Oki. Cr. 380, 214 P.2d 451 ( 19-10); State v.
Dillon, 1O+ Ariz. 33. 448 P.2d 89 ( 1968) ; Dash croon v.
State, 357 P.2d 236 ( 1960); People v. Lope:, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 424, 38+ P.2d 16 ( 1963).
The prosecutor, in his closing arguments to the jury,
is permitted to draw reasonable deductions from evicknce
offered in the case. Gatewood v. State, 1-17 P.2d 473. 80
Okla. Cr. 135 ( 194:>); State v. Brown, 35 \\'ash. '.hi 379,
213 P.2d 30;) ( 1949). The record reveals in the instant
case that the prosecutor clid confine his final arguments
to the evidence and reasonable deductions that could be
clra\\n therefrom, and such argument did not constitute
misconduct.
The fact that the prosecutor indicated that anyone
who would commit such a crime is "as low a person as

15
you will find," is not reversible error. In Gregg v. State,
69 Oki. Cr. 103, 101 P.2d 289 ( 1940), defendant was
charged with and convicted of rape. In his closing argument to the jury the prosecutor referred to the defendant as a "leacher." The Supreme Court of Oklahoma
held that such reference in prosecutor's closing argument
"as not error, where the deefndant's guilt was clearly
established by the evidence.
In Guldin v. State, 63 Ariz. 223, 161 P.2d 121 ( 1945),
clefrnclant was convicted of rape of his eight year old
stcpclaug;hter. Defendants' third assignment of error was
that the county attorney made the following prejudicial
n'marks in his argument before the jury: "This defendant is a sex-mad maniac." The Supreme Court reviewed
the c\·iclcncc in the case and held that such evidence supported the statement of the county attorney, therefore it
,,·as not re\Trsible error.
In the instant case, the phrase criticized by the appellant is the deduction of the prosecutor from the facts
Zh related. \\·herein he likens one who steals or takes a
\oung girl's \·irtuc unto the lowest type person you could
C\Tr run across. He was using a mere figure of speech
to strc'is and emphasize the enormity of the offense as
he vic\\Tcl it. He \\·as only calling to the attention of
the jury \\·hat every right-thinking person believes. The
characterization of the defendants' acts, not their racial
and social background, were in issue. Such statement was
ju.'itifiecl and permissible and the court did not err in
m nruling appellants' motion.
Let us not forget that the defendants were being
tried for the heinous crimes of rape and robbery. As
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stated in H'ingatc v. State, 212 So. 2d 44 (Fla. App.
1970) :
" ... Certainly the ideal climate for thr conduct of a criminal trial is one of fair and cool
impartiality. Goddend v. State, 141 Fla. ~8. 196
So. 596 ( 1940). Hm\T\Tr. the emotional wraknesses unto "·hich mrn arc prone ha\T been recognized by the common la\,. and prm·ision has
been made for these human fallibilities intruclr
upon the most experienced prosecuting attorneys."'
Id. at 45.
Assuming arguenclo that the manner of closing argument was prejudicial to the dedndants. it must still be
considered harmless error. Chapman z•. California, 306
e.s. l 8 ( 1967). ~Jany jurisdictions ha\"(' enunciated the
principle that the concept of a ''fair trial'" must not be
confused with that of a perfect trial. :\n accusccl has
a constitutional right to a "fair trial" but not ncn·ssarily to that seldom experienced rarity of a perfect trial.
State v. Smith, 119 \\'.\'a. 1-17. 191 S.E. '.>71. 574 ( 1964).
In light of the m-cn,·hclmint!" amount of n·idencc that
was brought forward by the State. the closing statement-;
of the prosecutor \\Tre harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt and would not affect the outcom1· of the trial.
POI:\IT l II
THE TRIAL C:Ol 'RT Dll> :\OT ERR I:\ REFl 'SI:\G
TO EXCCSE PROSPECTIYE .Jl'RORS FOR CAl'SE.

The court follm\Td lTtah laws and procedure \\hen
choosing the jury and therefore was not prejudicial in
its selection. Section 77-10-18 of Utah Code Ann. ( 1953)
state on what basis a juror can be disqualified. It reads:

17
"A _particular cause for challenge is: (I) For
such bias as, when the existence of the facts is
ascertained, in judgment of law disqualified the
juror, and which is known in this code as implied
bias.
" ( 2) For the existence of a state of mind on
thC' part of the juror which leads to a just inference in rderence to the case that he will not act
"·ith entire impartiality, which is known m this
code as actual bias."
l'ndcr thr l'tah Code there must be some type of
bias to disqualify a juror.
In the instant case the judge in examining the jury
\\as very exp! icit in determining whether or not each of
th<' potential jury members was biased. The appellant
an.rues that the judge should ha\-c dismissed the following
jurors for cause: \Ir. Dykes, ~Ir. Dee, ~fr. Cherry, Mrs.
"'ag"taff. \Ir. Herrera.
:\ppclbnt claims that \Ir. Dykes perjured himself
\\hen he stated that he had seen the defendants before
in tm, n. as cldcnclants \\Tre ne,,· to the city. There is no
e\·i<kncc of record to substantiate appellants' statement
that .\Ir. Dykes was lyin.g and, in fact, the juror had
no rca-;on to lie about such an incident. Immediately
;1ftcr n, kcs informed the court that he had seen the
ddrndants before. the following discussion took place:
THE COPRT: Do you feel any prejudice toward the Spanish American people generally?
.\IR. DYKES: No, Sir.
THE COl'RT: Do you feel any prejudice toward these two?
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l\IR. DYKES: No, like I say, I had onlv seen
them before. I can just recognize the~.
Later defense further objected to ~Ir. Dykes being
on the panel because he saw the defendants on 25th
Street. which would be a prejudice factor in this type of
case (R. UH).
The judge re\·ie\\·ecl the e\·iclence stated that the
juror had indicated that he thought he had seen the clrfcndants on 2-1th Street. but that he had never spoken
to them. The judge then said:
"I don't think the 2-1th Street area is that
notorious per sc. I will leave him here." ( R. 10-1-)
Such C\-idence certainh \\·ould not lead the judge
to an inference that this juror "·mile! not act "·ith complete impartiality.
The appellant implies that ~Ir. Cherry \\·as biased
because he \\·as acquainted \\·ith a murder charge and
"after thf' trial it was learned that appellants \\Trt' !wing
investigated in a murclcr case for ,,·hich co-clcfcncla11t
Batchelor was charged.'' No C'\·idcncc of record tics "\Ir.
Cherrv's statement into the prior conduct of am of the
defendants ( R. 8-1. 68) :
CHERRY: I ha\·C' no knowledge of this
court case. I have never hf'en acquainted with
any rape or robbery charge. I ha\T been acquainted with a murder charge.

~JR.

THE COl ~RT: There is no allegation of killinc;
here. Everybody is alive.
MR. CHERRY: I ha\T worked with sC\·cral
Spani.-;h people and I have no prejudice.
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THE COCRT: All right.
The appellant implied that Mr. Dee was biased because of tlw strong frelings he had about rape. An examination of the record. however, shows that such feelings
wf'rT discussf'd \\·ith the witness in detail, and the judge
"·as ju-.;tifiecl in bdieving that such state of mind of Mr.
Cherry \\·as not of such a nature that he could not render a fair and unbiased verdict:
Dee, vou indicate that you
have \Try strong feelings about rape.

~IR. ~IARSH: ~Ir.
~fR.

DEE: Yes.

~fR. ~L\RSH:

ment?

\\'hat do you mean by that state-

DEE: \\'ell, it is just that I suppose it is like
am·boch· else. It has never happened to my
da~1ght~·r. Providing he is guilty.

~fR.

~f ARSH: This emotional aversion that
might affect your verdict of guilt or innocence
of anv individual?

~IR.

DEE: I doubt it would have any bearing on
the \Trd ict. just a personal feeling against the
crime itself.

~rR.

I'm sure you have an aversion
against murder?

~IR. ~L\RSH:

~IR.

DEE: Yes.

~IR.

~L\.RSH:

charge?

~IR.

Perhaps some narcotic

DEE: Yes, the same.

type

~IR. ~lARSH: Is this basically the same type of

avcrsion'.1
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l\1R. DEE: Yes.
l\fR. 1\fARSH: Do vou frel that this aversion
would have any u~due influence on you?
MR. DEE: \Yell, I like to think not. I am trying
to be honest. As far as guilt or innounce is
concerned, like I sa\·, I don't think it would
have much bearing,. but then again it might
be subconscious.
l\fR. 1\IARSH: You think the fact that a person
is charged \\·ith a crime is any kind of indication of guilt or innocence or \\'Oulcl this arouse
any feeling of an animosity in yourself?
l\1R. DEE: \Veil. I feel that, in the clue process
of law and cvcrvthing, if a person is arrested
and were identified bv the ,·ictim. I frcl that
there must be some sort of significance to that.
l\fR. 1\IARSH: You feel that the fact that the
charge has been made and that an allcQation
has been made is, in fact, some ,,,·idence of
the guilt or innocence of the parties im·oln·d:'
l\fR. DEE: \\'cl, I feel that they ha\T been involved, yes, I don't kno\\' about guilt or innocence.
The trial judge later specifically addressed himself
to l\fr. Dec's reservations. He illicitcd the follo\\'ing
response from 1\lr. Dec and, in fact, all the jurors (R.
101, 102):
:MR. 1\fARSH: I would like to add a general
question, if I may, your Honor.
Now, 1\lr. Dec has indicated that he has some
rather strong reservations about the crime of rape
and the crime of robbery and has indicated that
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hr feds that the fact that somebody has been
charged and an allegation has been made, is m
fact. e\·idencr of - .
THE COl rRT: (Interposing) Let me put the
question this way.
Thr law provides and you ,,·ill be instructed
at the encl of the trial specifically that the fact
that a person is charged and brought into trial
is not n·idence of the guilt. that every person
starts out in a trial is presumed to be innocent
and that the presumption which continues until
the n·idrnce is sufficient to O\Trcome that bevond
a reasonable doubt, and even then you will ·consider all the evidence either way on it, but every
person is presumed innocent until you are con,·inccd beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt.
This is the basic law.
The fact that a charge has been made, any
possible reason that may exist for making the
charge. if it has any \·alidity or any value at all,
you "ill hear it. so the mere fact that a charge
has been made has no relevance as far as guilt
or innocence is concerned.
This "·ill be the instruction gi\·en you. Is there
reason \dw. ,·ou
\\·ill not be able to follow
.
that instruction?
( :'.': o res pome )

aI~\.

THE COl'RT: You may continue.
\IR. \l:\RSH: I have no other questions.
Appellant made similar objections with respect to
the juror, \lrs. \\'agstaff. indicating that her feelings
ari.-.;ing out of another rape case would bias her judgment
in the c;1sc. Rc,·icw of the record, however, indicates
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that the trial court did not err in failing to remove this
juror for cause.
The judge, exercising his discretion in the matter,
felt that l\Irs. "'agstaff would be able to render an unbiased judgment.
"I think that. judging number 1 Dlrs. \\'agstaff), I think she is upset no\\'. I think during
the trial she will stabilize herself and kno\\' that
this case is different from the other case." ( R. 1m)
Appellant objected
because he \\·as also a
dissuade his thinking.
juror would be able to
ment in the case.

to :'.\Ir. Herrera being on the jury
Spanish-American, \\·hich might
Once again the judge felt this
render a fair and unbiased judg-

"As far as the Spanish-American is concerned.
I think he is reluctant to han' the responsibility
and that is the onlv JTason. I think he \\ill mt·a~
ure up "·hen the cl~ips arc dm,·n. I ,,·ill lcaH· him
on." ( R. 103)
As noted abO\T, the l 'tah Code requires there to be
some type of bias to disqualify a JUror.
The judge in examining the jury ''as \Try explicit
in dcte1mining whether or not each of tht' potential
jury members ,,·as biased. On several occasions he asked
the jury whether or not they were biased.
Ctah case law points out that there is no bias if each
juror states he is impartial and wil try defendant according to imtructions. In Sta{(' v. 1\f usser, 110 Utah .13+,
175 P.2d 724 (19·16), the court held:
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"On trial of information charaina
;-,
:-., conspiracy
to inducr other-; to practice pol) gamous or plural
marriages. charge of bias on part of members of
\lnnnon church called to scr;e on the jury were
not -;ub-;tantiatecL where each said that he would
trY case accorclin,g to the evidence and the court's
instrucion. l\or could defendant object to jurors
\\·ho had knmdedge that said defendants has been
excommunicated from ~lormon church for ad,·ocatin~ or practicing polygamy, where such information was com-eyed to jury by their own
attorneys." Id. at 738.

In State l'. Com'l
23 \\'ash. 2d 539, 161 P.2d 442
(JlJi-'.>). there \\·as no prejudice or bias found even when
0

)',

a juror told a third party before trial that he did not
like the accused and seemed \"Cry antagonistic towards
him. The court held:
"\\"here prospectin· juror testified on preliminarv examination that his acquaintance with accu-.;cd or his family would not weigh with juror
;rnd that he knew no reason "·hv he could not act
as a fair and impartial juror, \~·hereupon he was
passt·d by accused's counsel for cause, affidavit
that such juror told affiant before trial that juror
did not like accused and seemed very antagonistic
to him \\·as insufficient to entitle accused to new
trial. in absence of any suggestion in record that
such juror \\·as influenced in his verdict by any
prejudice against accused." Id. at 446.
The lmnT court did everything necessary to issue a
fair and unbiased jury. The mere fact that some of the
j11rnr-.; mav ha\T had a preconceived notion as to guilt
or i1111occ11ce. without showing more, is not sufficient
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to rebuke the presumption of a juror's impartiality. As
stated in Irvin v. Dodd, 366 tT.S. 722 ( 1961):
"It is not required. however. that the jurors
be totally ignorant of the facts and issues im·olvecl.
In these days of swift, widespread and diverse
methods of communication. an important case
can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the vicinity. and scarcely any of those best
qualified to serve as jurors will not ha\T formed
somr impression or opinion as to the merits of
the case. This is particularly true in criminal casrs.
To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an
accused, without more. is sufficient to rebuke the
presumption of a prospective juror's impartialitv
would be to establish an impossible standard. It
is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a \Trdict based on
the eviednce presented in court."
One important preliminary consideration to
be given the issue nm,· raised by appdlant is that
a wide degree of discretion is \Tsted in a trial
court in determinin.g whether an impartial jun
may be obtained. This determination should not
be overruled unless it mav. clcarlv. be shown that
the trial court abused it discretion. Annot.. Prrtrial Publicity in Criminal Case as Affecting Defendant\ Rightto Fair Trial-Federal Cases, 10
L.Ed.2d 1243, ~6(a), at 1266 (1964).
The trial court in the imtant case, bdirving the
assertion-; of the prospective jurors that they could render
a fair and impartial trial, did not abuse its discretion by
failing to dismiss any of the jurors for cause.
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POI;\T IV
THERE IS :\0 CC~ll"LATl\'E, EFFECTIVE ERRORS
.JCSTIFYJ;\(; A RE\'ERSAL I;\ THE I.:-.;STA:'\T CASE.

Thr doctrine announced in State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah
2d :no. '.!8'.! P.'.!cl 323 ( 19:):)), that in some instances
errors, "·hich when standing alone would not justify
rc\Trsal. may ha\·e such a cumulative effect so as to
ckprin· thr accused of a fair trial. is not disputed by
rr,pondcnt. Hmff\·er. respondent submits that the instant
cN' docs not meet the degree of error and criteria set
forth in Stat1· l'. St. Clair, supra. The duty of the appelbtr court is set forth in 3 l·tah 2d 244:
On the basis of such appraisal. if the court can say

"·ith assurance that the e\'idence of the defendants' guilt
\\a-; -;o clear and con\'incing that no reasonable jury
could be expected to return a different \'erdict, even in
the ab-;cnce of the irregularities, then the errors would
fw ham1Jc.-;s and the \Trdict should be permitted to stand.
On tlw other hand. if there is a rrasonable likelihood
that i11 th1· abffnrt' of the errors a different verdict might
lum b11·11 roufrrnl, a new trial should be granted. (empha-;i-.; added.)
In the instant case there is no cumulation of errors
1;0 a' to justify a conclusion that a different \'erdict would
ha\T been reached by the jury in the absence of such
rrror-;. In Stat1· v. St. Clair, supra, the cumulation of
nror.-; -;upportcd this court's finding that it was reason;dJh likeh· the \'crdict of the jury would ha\'e been diffrn·nt hut for the errors. Howc\'er. the alleged errors in
the in.'>tant case do not justify such a conclusion.
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To conclude that a cumulation of errors has precluded appellant from ha\·ing a fair trial first necPssitates a conclusion that errors \\TIT committed. Respondent submits that this is not the case and that State v. St.
Clair, supra, is clearly distinguishable.
Respondent submits that this court should follow
State v. Sinclair, 15 t:tah 2d 163, 389 P.2d 469 ( 1964),
wherein it is stated at 15 Utah 2d 170:
"Under our statute (Utah Cod<' Ann. ~77-42-1
( 1953), which requir<'s that <'tTors "·hich do not
affect the essential rights of the parties b<' disregarded, we cannot properly int<'rfrtT with the
jury's \·erdict, unless upon a rruirw of thr who!I'
case it should apprar that th('rc was error of rnfficicnt gravity that thr rfrfl'nrlant's ri~hts w1 re
prejudircd in some substantial way. \\'<' ha\T
found nothing of any such consequence here."
(Emphasis added.)
Respondent submits that a review of the whole record
requires a conclusion that the appellant rcccivccl a fair
trial and that no error was committed that prejudiced
appellant in a substantial \\·av.
CONCLUSION

It is clear that the jury was convinced from the e\'idencc adduced at the trial of the appellants' guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The record substantiates and necessitates a conclusion that no error \Vas committed that resulted in a substantial prejudice to the appellants. There-
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fore. respondent submits that appellants' contentions are
wholly without merit that the convictions be affirmed.
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